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ARLY fbrecasts for 1983indicate tlmat it will he time
fomirth consecutive year of low incomsme fUr farmners.
Speaking at the U.S. Departmmment of Agriculture’s
(USDA) recent Outlook Conference, governmnemst and
industry analysts alike agreed tlmat time combination of
large carryover stocks, cleclimming exports amid limited
reductions ml outpmmt will not promote significatit in-
creases in depressed grain prices, wimicim are importamit
determinants of mmet farm income. Time relatively low
price and reduced farm immeomne outlook for gramns is
expected tohe ofRet somewimatby modest immcreases in
hvestock prices. The retail priceoffood, as mneasmmred
by the food conmponemmt of the Consmsmner Price index
(CPI), is expected to increase by 3 percemmt to 6 percent
in 1983.
This article is divided into two parts. The first sec-
tion reviews and summarizes time data presented at the
Outlook Conference, and discusses price amid procluc—
tion figures for 1982 and forecasts fir 1983 iii primary
commodity groupings. Tine second section anmalvzes
thegrain surplus problem that commtinuestokeepprices
and fhrm income at relatively low levels. The discus-
sion indicates that curremit policies designed to in-
crease farmprices while limiting surplus accumulatiomm
provide conflicting incentives that inhibit the
plishment ofeither objective. Fimmally, provisiomms oftine
paynment-in-kind (P1K) program are evaluated as a
means of resolving commflicts among existing policies.
Ou”fj{)OK SUMPvIARY
Retail Food Prices-
The rate of increase in retail food prices, as nmea-
suredby the CPi, is expected to he toward the low end
of the 3 percent to 6 percent range in 1983.’ Data
Paul C. Wescott, The 1983 Outlook for Food Prices and Con-
sumimptioml, Outlook ‘83. Proceedings ofthe Agricultural Outlook
Conference, Washimmgton, i).C., December 1. 1982 (United States
Departmnent ofAgriculture), PP 639—50.
released in January revealed that fbod prices immcreased
about 4 percent in 1982, the smallest rate of increase
since 1976. Generall smaller immcreases in marketing
costs — associated with the reduction in the n-ate of
inflatiomm — amid reiatively large smmpplies of mmmost major
commodities were cited as time factors helmindl this
damnpening of food price increases. Poor weather,
larger—than—expected (export or dommmestic) demammd or
an unexpected acceleratiomm of general inflatiomm, how-
ever, could increase the growth rate of retail food1
prices to time upper emmd of the.3 percemmt to 6 percent
forecast range. Historical and firecast data for fhod
prices are hsted mm table I -
financial Coiidition.s’
Most fimmammcial indicators for time fiirnmsector declimiecl
in 1982 and are not expected to show sigmficammt inn—
provemneut in 1983. Althouglm complete farnm hscommme
data and forecasts were not available at time Outlook
Conference. estinmates released un Jammuarv place 1982
net farnm income at 820.4 billion with forecastsfor 1983
iii the $16 billion to $20 billion range. Direct govern-
imment pay’memmts to fhrmers were about $3.5 billion. As
chart I shows. n-cal net farimm insconme is ahout one—third
of its 1972 level amid is expected to decline againm in
1983. Particularly important to firm income in 1983
will he time strength of export demand and the smmccess
of progranmms aimned at achieving reductiomms iii grain
stocks and production.2
Actual returmms to farmers in 1982 would have been
even lesshad it miot been for government price support
amid subsidy payments As chart 2 imidicates,commodi-
ty prices below the target prices of support programs
led to a three—fold immcrease in time level of Conmmnmoditv
Credit Corporatiosm ((2CC) payments forpricesupports
2
Ronald L. Mcekhof, “Agm’ieultural Finamsce Outlook,” Outlook ‘83,
Pmocecdings of tIme Agricultural Outlook Comsferemmee, Washington,
I).C. , Decemmsher I, 1982 (United States Departusent ofAgricul-
tore). PP. 469—81.
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Contributimg positively to time income outlook of
farmersin 1983are projections ofcontinued reductions
imi imiterest rates and time prices ofprimnary inputs rela-
tive to output prices. Altlmough imiterest rates fell in
1982, the dechimmes probably occurred too late in the
year — after contracts for seed and fertilizer were
writtems — to have reduced costs significantly. Time
world oil glut and lower immput prices, however, did
reduce costs in 1982 and are expected to reduce them
furtimer in 1983. If declining immterest rates and farm
immput costs materialize in 1983, net firm imicomne could
he inmproved even in time absence of output price imm—
creases. According to the USDA, however, an~’ mnajor
Time dilemnma facing graimm prodlucers in 1983 is, at
least un part, time result ofpolicy actiomms takemm imm 1982°
After the record harvests of 1981, wheat and corn
pm’oducers were encouraged to participate in the re—
duceci acreage program (RAP). 1mm return for idling a
portiomm oftheir base acreage, fam’mners were eligible to
participate in time Partner-Owned Reserve (FOR) andh
to receive both price support loamis and deficiemmey
pay’meimts. Time objective of these programs was to
increase grain prices by reducing graimi output.6
6
Ami important change in the 1981 hmtml bill is tIme shift from “set—
aside” progransss to time RAP. Under aset-aside, farnsers were asked
to idle a certain percentage of their acm’eage without stipulations
concernsing what was grown 0mm remainsing land. ‘hums, ifthe reasoms
for a set-aside wasto increase wheat pm’ices. the progran mnav Imave
heen totally inefkctive if the 10 percent of acm’cagc idled was
formerly plamlted ins oats and wheat plantings were unchanged. The
RAP attempts to ovcrconne this problcnm by using crop-specific
acreage reduetions4 that is, awheat RAPnow calls lksr aredueticsn in
the acreage hsistoric’ally planted in wlseat.
Table I
Changes in Consumer Price Indexes (1980—83)
FoodCategory 1980 1081 1982 1983
Al Food 86~ 79°a 25*o 3 ~
Faodawayfrornhome 99 90 49 4 6
Foodatimome 80 73 18 36
Meats 29 36 56 36
Beef aedveal 57 09 07 2 5
Pork 34 08 159 -7
Poultry 51 41 5 25
Eggs 18 83 67 a 0
Damryproducts 98 1 15 2 5
Fmstmandseatood 9 83 09 25
Fnaandvegetthles 73 120 63 1 4
Sugaraudsweets 220 79 27 3 8
CeeSafmdb eryprodu 110 100 2.9 2 5
Ftsandotl 66 107 09 25
NonAlcohqhcbeveages 106 42 03 6
Olbrprepaedfoods 108 103 30 36
Forecas
SOURCE Htstonoai data from Department ci Labor’ torecas by U Department a Agr cultur
Economme Research Setvtce
amid other nncomne trammsfers (e.g. ‘torag subsidies~. ~ innpros c mnemmts mm mmet fam ni income will hase to comnc
In fiscal sear 1982 time cost of go’ ermmmnent prognams from higimem priccs for farm prodmmcts resmmlting ftoni
rose to aimnost 812 billion ss ith about $2 hihhiomm fUr thc large immcreases imm aggregate demammd — espcciall\ cx—
(laim S programmm and $10billion in loans amid subsidies ibm port diemnand.
gm aimv, cotton amid somc 20 othmcr supported commod
itics. 1.. milc ss target prices aie frozen at 1982 hexels or -
otmtput edimictiomms immcrcase market pm ices budget of
ficials has c estimated that the cost of pmice suppom’t
p ogramns could escer d 815 hilhomi imi fiscil car 1983
‘Othercontrihutimmgfactorsto tine current situation oflow prices and
large surpluses were tIme 1980 Soviet export emnhargo, record
yields, time appreciation of time dollar and export subsidies for
Fmench and Canadians wheat.
3
”Targct prices” arc established by law. If market prices for a
supported consnmodity 6,11 below time target price, fimrniers nneetimmg
eligibility requiremmsents receive a deficiency payment’’ based 0mm
the difl’e,’emmce belweemm time target level and nmmamket price.
tm
Sce Setlm S. Kimlg, “Farmn Pi’ice Props Expected to Rise Above ‘82
Record. ,\‘ew )‘ork Tiune.s (January 23, 1983).
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The programs, however, did not achieve the desired
level of output reductions. Provisions of tine wheat
program were announced after much of the winter
wheat crop had been planted. As such, the 48 percent
overall participation rate in the wheat program was an
unbalanced mnix of how participation by producers of
winter wheat and high participation by producers of
spring wheat. The corn program was even hess success-
ful with about a2 4percent participation rate.
Output reductions achieved by the programs were
more than offset, however, by ideal growing weather
and record yields. The 2 percent reduction in corn
acreage was countered by a4 percent increase inyields
to an average of 114 bushels per acre. The picture for
wheat was somewhat different. The 48 percent par-
ticipation rate in the acreage reduction program
achieved a 1 percemmt decline in the total wimeat crop
from the level of 1981’s record harvest.
The volume of wheat and corn production in the
1982 crop year had some important consequences. As
the data in table 2 indicate, the United States now
holds about 76 percent of world corn stocks and 39
percent of world wheat stocks; these figures are ex-
pected to increase to 85 percent and 44 percent, re-
spectivehy, in 1983. These data also indicate that the
United States is expected toproduce almostone-half of
all corn and one-sixth of ahl wheat grown in the world
during this crop year. Although the volume of corn
exports is expected to increase about 9 percent to
aimnost 55 million metric tons, the price of corn, cur-
rently at a 10 year how, may actuallydecrease the vahue
of corn exports. The volume of wheat exports is ex-
pected to declineabout 8 percent to 45 million metric
tons.’
Although both the wheat and corn programs have
added apaid diversion asan extraincentiveto programn
participation in 1983, the predonminant view amnong
analysts appears tohe that acreage reduction alonewill
not increase prices significantly.8 One estimnate con-
cluded that if the corn program achieved 70 percent
compliance among eligible producers (almost triple
the 24 percent comnphiance rate of 1982), the price in
the Eastern corn belt will reach only$2.80 per bushel,
about equal to the target price. The same analysts,
however, cautioned that a compliance rate this high is
unlikehy; little new storage space is being built and
many producers hikehy will withdraw from time pro-
grams if market prices begun to strengthen. None of
these analyses, however, considered the effects of the
P1K program that officially was announced after the
‘One metric ton is equivalent to about 37 bushels of wheat or 39
bushels ofcorn.
tUmodem apaid diversion unlike a voluntaryset-aside — producers
are givens a payment for not producing on a portion oftheir land,
For example, under 1983 corn program mules, producers will be
paid $150 per bnmshel on the 10 percent oftheir base acreage and
yield that constitutes the diversion, Titus is in contrast to the 10
percent of their land which coomstitutes the voluntary’ acreage re-
duction and receives no direct paynnents. Apossible reasonfor low
compliance with the 1982 program isthat nmo direct payments were
made to produces’s for las-ing idle a portion oftheir land,
Billion of dollorn
1970 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 1982
Soo,co; 0S. Dopo,,,,o”t of Ag,kof,,,,,
to, ,,oot, ta,
0
1 y,o’h’oIode bodg.Ioolloyo to, boo,, po,cb,one of oo,pbo, dobo,
p,oth,’”, oobobdboo, 00,00, o,dt~o,0po~bonboo,o,to
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Table 2






Poduchnon 4044 436~0 4434
011 SImon 412J 4065 4 88
Endln9Stocks 491 787 1032
Stocks/Utiizaticn (C’) 19 19,4 246
Tade 182 715 688
United States
Production 1688 08 2116
Utolrzatmon 1238 1 45 295
xports (OctoberSeptember) 588 500 546
ndingStock 263 801 876
S. StocksiWoold Stocks (C’) 53 6 76.4 849
WHEAT
World
Production 4383 4458 461 6
Utilization 4448 4362 4535
Ending Stock 746 823 904
Stocks/Utikzation (°4 188 188 199
Trade 965 10 8 1030
United tales
Production 646 76 0 76
Utdi atoon 211 231 235
Exports(July/June 41 9 48 1 450
EndtngStocks 269 31.7 398
US Stocks/WoldStocks( o) 36,1 38 440
8001W Nostoncal dataand forecasts by U S Department ofAgricultu e Ecormomn Research Set
vice
Outlook Conference. Tk probable impact of tIme P1K Some price increases for bce fand po k are likch\ to
prog am is dmscu. sed later in tlmis articlc. m esult from thme rcdmmction in aggregate reel mmmeat sup—
plies. Aimah sts are cxpectimmg a 1 percent dechimie ism
comnmercual bcef prochnmctiomm xx hmmch I ‘ expected to
coe ise cattle prices hs 3 percemmt iml 1983. Prices fUr Red tlcats Dc spste loss fee d Cr
0 ammm pm’mce s fimian—
choice Ommm ‘dma steers ame expected to m’each $66.25 pet coal commssderatoons hike Is xx mil result mmm a secondi C 0mm—
hundred we mght (ent. ) up from 864.25 per cxx t. mu
secutmsesear of lox er reel mmmeatproductmomm. C ashm flow
1982. ( onimmmercmal prochuctmomm ms cxpected to he 22.3
prohiems hase’ forc el producers to m’educe thmemr debt hmlhoomm pounchs nm 1983 dow mm frommm about 22.4 last scar. antI to ge ne rate mnternah capmtah. To accomplm hi thims
Ascrige prices for hirross 5 and gmlts are expect dl to
producem imas e lmquodated lie rchs mmmd re t’immmed ‘i smmmahhei .— rmse o percemit to ShS. nO PC r cwt. in 1983 bascd omi an
thmamm aserage mmumber of immmmnals for hreedimmg pur
expected 6 pcicent di op mmm productiomi
poses. The reduc ‘ci bre edmng Imerds mmnpls a dechmmme mmm
red meat production in 1983.
Beef amid pork producers ommcomes imke Is will he
‘Ron ild k Cnnstml omo .mnsd Ie lmmmd W Southard Rcd SI ‘it Out stre msathmene d furthmem bs mcdhuctions in production
look Outlook 83 Proce done, of th Am,rncomltemral Outlook C on
fe re nec 5% slmonatomm, I) C Nosennber 30 198 (0. nsmtt d St. tes costs mnost mmotahhs mmi feed costs and mmmtemcst rites. For
Departmncmmo of ~ ‘meulti re b pp 319— S mnstmnce fecci costs for hiobs dechimieeh s’s—Si pci 100
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poundsofweightgain in 1982whilefeed costsforcatfie
declinedby about$10per 100pounds ofgain. Withthe
likelihood of continued low grain prices and further
reductions in interest rates in 1983, producers again
should face a favorable cost picture.
Poultry and Eggs — Broiler production is expected
to increase slightly in 1983. This, together with slow
growth in demand, is expected to moderate price in-
creases. Growth inaggregatedemandwill continue at
lowrates as aresultofthe slow economicrecoveryand
asubstantialreduction inthe level ofexports, down 30
percent in 1982 from the previous year’s levels. In
addition, demand has failed to increase in responseto
relatively high red meat prices.to
Afterpoor returnsin 1980and 1981, lowerfeedcosts
increased the incomes ofegg producers in 1982. Pro-
duction figures for 1983 are expected to approximate
1982 levels. Some cutbacks in the number ofreplace-
mentpulletswill tend to limit productiou gains. Even
with eggproduction at 1982levels, however, prices in
1983 should remain near their 1982 average level of
about 70 centsper dozen; asubstantial drop in foreign
demand is expected to offset the efl~cts of stablepro-
duction figures.
Dairy — Milk production is expected to be 135.8
billion pounds in 1982, 2 percent above year-earlier
levels. Although producer reaction to the 50-cent de-
ductions imposed by the Secretary of Agriculture is
still uncertain, production is expected to increase
another 1.9 percent in 1983. These increases in pro-
ductionwilloccur despite reductions in averageprices
from 1981 levels. Prices declined an average of 1.8
percentin 1982due to a“roll-back”in thelevel ofprice
support to $13.10 per cwt. and continued surplus
production.”The effects of output price declines on
producers’ incomes, however, were ofl~et somewhat
by reductions in feed costs paid by producers.
The dairy outlook necessarily reflects the assump-
tions about specific policy provisions that will be in
‘°AIlenBaker, “Poultryand EggOutlook,” Outlook‘83, Proceed-
ings ofthe AgriculturalOutlook Conference, Washington, D.C.,
November 30, 1982 (United States Department ofAgriculture),
pp. 329-33.
“The support had been raisedto $13.49per cwt. —15 percent of
parity—on October1, 1981. Speciallegislation enactedonOcto-
ber20, 1981, “rolledback”thesupport level to $13.10. Whenthe
1981 Foodand Agriculture Actwas adopted in December 1961.
the $13.10 figurewasmaintainedlbrtheremainderofthe 1981—82
marketing year. The Farm Bill also scheduled an increase to
$13.25per cwt. for the 1962-83 marketIngyear. However, with
production surpluses continuing, special legislation enacted in
September1982heldthe supportpriceat $13.10untilOctober 1,
1984. The newsupport thenwill besetat thelevel ofparity$13.10
represented on October 1, 1983.
effect during 1983. If the support price remains at
$13.10 per cwt. and the Secretary of Agriculture im-
poses both of the authorized 50-cent deductions, the
following results are likely this year. ~ Production will
increase by 1.9 percent and USDA purchases of sur-
plus products will increase by 8.8 percent (milk
equivalent).’3 The average price received for all milk
will decline by 1.8 percent, butcash receipts (includ-
ingdirect payments)will increase by9.7 percent. The
numberofcows used inproduction will increaseby 1.0
percent.
PROBLEM AREAS FOR 1983
The 1982price and productionestimates presented
at the USDA Outlook Conference indicate that low
relativepricesand largegrain surpluses continueto be
the primary sources ofconflict in agricultural policy.
The following discussion argues that conflicting incen-
tives in U.S. agricultural programs, on balance, have
promoted expansions in grain production that in-
creasedsurpluses and loweredrelative prices and farm
income. Thoughmany programs are similar in design,
only corn and wheat are discussed in detail.
To understandthe currentstructure ofgrain policies
and the results they have fostered, it is necessary to
know something about the price and production his-
tory ofthe major commodities, corn and wheat. Until
the mid-1970s, it commonlywas agreed that ongoing
technological improvements and a slow transition of
excess labor from agriculture created an environment
inwhich “chronicsurpluses,”lowor decliningrelative
prices and lower farm incomes were the norm. Since
the 1930s, when price support programs were estab-
lished, government’s response to this situation has
beento legislate “fair” prices for farm products and to
purchase surplus production at these prices.
In themid-1970s, however, therewas aperceptible
change in expectations. For avariety ofreasons — the
beginningofthe firstRussian grain sales in 1972, price
supportprogramsthatidledone-fifthofU.S. cropland,
andlarge increases in total export demand— real farm
income reached a record high in 1973 and remained
abovehistoricallevels in 1974 and 1975. Many analysts
and farmers believed that these events signalled an
end to the eraoflow prices and commodity surpluses;
“Clifford M. Carman, “UnitedStates Outlooklbr Dairy,”Outlook
‘83, Proceedings of the Agricultural Outlook Conference,
Washington, D.C., November30, 1982 (United States Depart-
meat of AgrIculture), pp. 436-41.
‘3U.S. Department ofAgriculture purchases surplus products In
several lbnnsm butter, AmerIcan cheese, nonfat dry milk and
evaporated milk.
18FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS FEBRUARY 1983
theprevailing opinion wasthat a combination of many
fhctors finally had solved the agricultural “problem”:
“The secular income problem in agriculture is now
largely behind us. The emerging equilibrium in the
labor market is of major significance in this respect.
When this equilibrium is combined with the decline in
the rate ofproductivity growth, the release of most of
the idled land back to production, and the shift to the
right in the demandfor agricultural products as aresult
of devaluation, the result is an almost total disappear-
ance of the excess capacity that existed at prevailing
price ratios for such a long time. “i
This view has led some analysts recently to argue that
unabated increases in world food demand and limita-
tions on U.S. productive capacity likely are tomake the
1980s adecade ofcommodity shortagesand rising food
prices.~ Within this view, a major development in
agricultural policy during the 1980s will be ‘[t]he de-
clining role of price and income supports and produc-
tion adjustment programs.
Although this brief history gives short shrift to the
political and economic complexities that have shaped
agricultural policies, it does provide a flavor for the
attitudes that have led to the current policy mix. On
the one hand, legislators have persisted in their belief
that minimum levels ofsome commodity prices should
be established by law to provide a “fair” return to
producers of those products. On the other hand, the
crop shortages and volatile prices of the early 1970s
have spawnednew gram storage programs that simul-
taneously attempt to stabilize prices and provide an
adequate reserve stock in the event of further short-
ages. This policy mix, general macroeconomic activity
and random events in nature have produced the cur-
rent production and price situation in agriculture.
As 1983 begins, three sets of major grain programs
arein place: the reduced acreage program (RAP), price
‘See G. Edward Sclinh, ‘‘The New \l aeroecononi ic’s ofAgricul-
ture, American Jonrita? ofAgricultural Econoolin 1 December
1976), pp. 802—Il.
“See. lbrexample, Ann Crittenden, “Can the World Feed Itself?”
an interview with Howard Hjort, New )‘ot’k Tunes’, Fehrnarv 11,
1982: ,J, B Penn. ‘‘Ecotiooi ie I )eveloptnents in U. S. Agriculture
During the I 970s’’ atid Jo A - Selin ittker, ‘A Framework for
Food a,id AgrienItoral Po1kv for the I 980,’’ both included in
Food aridAgricoItotvtl l-’o/icqfor Hi e I 980s, I). Gale John son, ed
American Enterprise Institute, Washington, I).C. , 1981. An
opposing view is preset ted liv Don Paarlherg, ‘‘The ScareiIv
S vodroIne, Anterican] onrae? ofAgricu ltnral Ecor,olnw.s’ Feb “m-
an’ 19421, pp. 110—LI, and MichaelV. Martin and Ray F. Brokken,
‘i’he Scarcity Svn(Ironic: Consment, ‘‘ Amenc’afl JournalofAgrm—
cultural Erorton,ics 1February 1983), pp. 154—59.
itiiither ‘‘A 1’raniework for Focal, ‘‘ p. 210.
support programs and the Farmer-Owned Reserve
(FOR). Each program attempts to manage the supply
of grains to achieve either stable prices above some
minimum level oradequate reserve stocks in the event
ofnewcommodity shortages.1’ Because these goals are
not always compatible, however, existing policies
oftenwork against eachother; theresults are thus ofteu
contrary to stated objectives.
MAJOR GRAIN PROGRAMS~
Acreage Reduction Programs
Farmers are encouraged to reduce production
through two types of programs. One is the reduced
acreageprogram (RAP) in which a farmer “voluntarily”
agrees to idle a portion of his acreage; the actual
amount is based on the acreage planted in the past
(called the historical base acreage). A farmer has an
economic incentive to comply, however, only if the
benefits of compliance exceed their costs. Typically,
these benefits include eligibility for price support
loans, income support payments and participation in
the FOR; the cost of not complying is the income
foregone by not producing on the idled land. A paid
diversion, winch represents aportion of the RAP, pro—
~‘idcsa cashpayment forfarmers who idle the required
percentage of their base acreage.’°
Prjce St.ipports
Grain prices are supported primarily by loan rates
while income is supported 1n’ target pnces. Under
provisions ofthe price stipport loan—rate program, pro—
ducers who comply with grain program requirements
(for instance, reduced acreage) are eligible for a nonre-
course loan. Producers then have two options: they can
hold their grain and market it at their discretion or they
can obtain a loan. The value ofa loan is determined by
the loan rate multiplied b~’the number of bushels
7
Thesc’ pm-ogranu focus on supply strategies because previous
atte mnpts to increase pri~’tc’dc’,nanc
1
br food have had Ii,,i itecl
imnpaet onfi cdl prices. 5cc, for example, ~s I. BeIongia, ‘‘Domestic’
Food Programs is!, cI Their Re latecl Impaeton I’oocl Prices, ‘‘ Ame,’—
ica,i Journal ofAgricultural Fcooonnc.s iNlay 1979), pp. 358—62.
IsA more detailc’d cli senss ionof thc’se prograius at ‘dl thc’ir impactson
economic activity can he fbuncl in Bruce L. Gardner, The Go,:—
erriing of ,Agriculturc, The Regents Press of Kansas, Lawrence,
Kansas. 1981.
)WE’he 1983 cormi and wheat RAPboth requite a 20percentreduction
in hase ac’reagc’. ‘Flic corn progrinn incluclc’s a 10 pet-eelk paid
divc’rsion : 5 pem’ec’tit of tlsc’ whc’at prograni is’s paid cliversion.
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placed in storage. Theloan rateis alegislativelydeter-
mined price per bushel that serves, essentially, as a
price floor.
Theloan Isin effect for lessthan oneyear. If market
prices do not riseto levels substantiallyabove the loan
rate over the period of the loan, farmers can forfeit
their grain to the CCC as hill payment for the loan.
Forfeiture ofgrain in this mannercontributes to CCC
grain stocks— government stocks separatefrom those
in the FOR. In contrast, if market prices should rise
above loan rates, farmers may elect to repay the loan,
remove their grain from storage and sell it.
Producer income is supported directly by target
prices and deficiency payments. Ifmarket prices are
below the target price established by law, farmers
receive a transfer payment from the government for
the size ofthe price differential. An advantage to this
program is that deficiency payments effectively raise
farmers’ incomeswithout generating higher prices to
consumers or the purchase of large surplus stocks by
the government.A disadvantage isthat deficiencypay-
ments can become veryexpensive to the government
— and taxpayers — if large quantifies of grain are
eligible for the maximum payment.
To illustrate how the program works, consider the
1982 wheat crop when the June-October avenge
wheat price was $3.34per bushel, the targetprice was
$4.05 per bushel and the loan rate was $3.55 per
bushel. The deficiency payment is calculated as the
difference between the targetprice and the higher of
the loan rate or average market price for the first five
months ofthemarketingyear(June-October). Because
market priceswere belowtheloan rate— the effective
pricefloor— deficiencypayments lastyearwere based
instead onthe difference between the targetprice and
loan rate ($4.05 — $3.55 = $.50). The 48 percent of
wheatproducerswho compliedwith acreage reduction
provisions then were eligible for a 50-cent per bushel
incomesupport or deficiency payment. These produc-
ers received $475 million in deficiency payments for
the 1982 wheat crop.
The Farmer-Owned Reserve (FOR)
The FOR was established in 1977 to promote grain
price stability. In principle, the FOR stabilizes prices
by releasing stored grainto themarket when pricesare
high and removing grain when prices are low. In one
sense, it is an additional element of the CCC loan
program described earlier.
The initial CCC loan has atypical duration ofnine
monthsatwhich timetheparticipantmusteitherrepay
theloanorlbrfeithisgrain totheCCC. Underthe FOR
afarmer has athird option. He can receive aprepaid
subsidy (26.5 cents per bushel annual payment) to
storehis grainfora longerperiodandextend thelength
ofhis loan at below-marketinterest rates; the interest
rateforthelasttwoyearsoftheloaniszero. Loan
extensions typically have coveredthree years; thus, a
participant must keep his grain off the market for a
three-year period unless market prices increase to a
predetermined level; by repaying the loan, farmers
then can remove grain from the FOR and sell it. A
farmer must repaystorage costs and other penalties if
the loan is redeemed under conditions that do not
satisfr the requirements established by program for-
mulae.
GRAIN PROGRAMS AND ECONOMIC
ACTIVITY
The m4or grain programs have had a substantial
effect on economic behavior. On a purely descriptive
level, the datashow that grain prices have persistedat
relatively lowlevels and real farm incomehas fallen to
historiclows;atthe sametime, thecostsofgovernment
support programs have reached record highs. On a
more analytic level, however, it is interesting to in-
vestigate the economic incentives that have produced
these results. Thus, rather than attribute the low
pricesand income to unusually goodweatheror other
random events, as many analysts have done, one
should examine the program’s incentives to seeif they
reveal conflicts that could account for the observed
results, especially those that seem contrary to the
stated objectives of the programs.
Programs That Increase Production
Farmerswill increase theirgrain production ifthey
expect grain prices to increase, if they expect their
costs to decline or both. Although grain programs do
reduce costs of farmers through free crop insurance
and the interest subsidies mentioned earlier, their
most important influence is on the distribution ofex-
pected output prices.2°By increasing the average
Wcovenmentprogramsaffectl~nneri costsina varietyofways. In
thelongerrun, USDAresearchproduces technologicalinnovations
(e.g.,disease resistantcrops)andInformation (e.g.,outlookreports,
budgeting and businessmethods) that helplowercosts. Converse-
ly, pricesupport programs tendto Increase costs becauseIncreases
in expectedoutput priceswill tendto causeincreasesIn thepricesof
Inputs, especially land. The net effectofgovernmentprogramson
Srmers’ costs wouldbe difficult to determine.
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Figure 1
Effects of Support Program on Expected Crop Price and Price Variability
EFFECTS OF ANNOUNCED SUPPORT PRICE:
a) All probabilities associated with prices





(mean) price expected b producers and reducing the
variabihtv of expected market pnces, prognin~~ that
establish a price floor tend to encourage farmers to
increase production.2~
Figure 1 shows how. For simplicity, grain prices are
assumed to he distributed normallyaround some aver-
age value. E(P), with a given variance, a2, in the
absence ofgovernment programs. The mean pricerep-
resents the ‘<best guess” ofwhat actualprices willhe at
harvest; it is the priceupon which production decisions
willbe based. In practice, E(P) could be tbe cashprice
at the time of planting or the futures price dated for
end-of—season delivery minus the cost of storage.
2t
The same general argument applies to target prices and direct
income transfers made via deficiency payments. That is, cligihle
producers are guaranteed at planting a minimum harvest price
equal to the market price pins a direct payment equal to the
minimum ofthedifference hetweenthetarget priceandeither the
loan rate or market price.
The efleetsofa pricesupport programalso are shown
in figure 1.22 First, an efl~ctivesupport mustbe set at a
level greater than F, to aflèct economic activity. If no




W/ithomit a prices upport program, the expected price would he
calculated as:
cc
F(P) cc ,fp ‘V(P)dP.
0
After a price support program is imposed. however, the left-hand
tail ofthe distrihntinn is reallocated overthe am-ca tothe right ofP,.
the most hasic represeistation of this change is to “stack” the
shaded area at F,; the expected pricewould then he calculated as:
cc
F(F~)cc F, j’ W(P)dP + JF t(P)dP.
0 F,
A more mathematical anal sis of this example and simulation
results can he found in Michael l3oehlje and Steven Griffin,
Financial lssspacts of Government Support Price Programs,”
,4mencan Jon ma? ofAgrico?tv ma? Econooncs (May 1979), pp.
285—96.
E(P) E{p*l
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at F,, or below would he viewed as irrelevant. But, an
effi,ctive price support, at say, F,, increases the ex-
pected pricefrom EU) toE(F*). The shaded areaofthe
price distribution to the left of F, represents the por-
tion ofthe oldprice distribtmtion that is noweliminated;
the probabilities attached to this range of prices are
now “reassigned” to F,. This shift in the expected price
distribution mustincrease EU) which, ceteris parihus,
will tend to increase production.23
Thisreshaping of the expected price distribution by
a price support may have an even greater impact on
production through its impact on the variability of
expected prices24 Ifthe new price distribution facing
fhrmers has a lower variance, farmers face less price
risk than they’ did before2a Farmers’ output decisions
will he based on ahigher expected price and lower risk
of price fluctuations. If farmers are generally risk—
averse, the reduced price risk also will generate
greater production.
Programs That Decrease Production
As the foregoing suggests, programs designed to
increase commodity prices also tend to increase pro-
duction. The unfortunate side effect of this reponse is
that increased production tends to decrease prices. In
recognition of this, price support programs often re-
quire compliance with a reduction of the number of
acres planted under programs of the form described
earlier.
But, will the reduction in the number of acres
planted necessarily stipport prices at levels desired by
the legislation? It is unlikely unless more acreage is
idled than is typically the case, for the following
reasons. First, because farmers canselectthe land they
idle, they will designate the poorest quality land for
participation in the RAF. Thus, the reduction in
quantity produced will be proportionately smaller than
that suggested by the number ofacres idled. Second,
depending upon individual circumstances, fhrmers
also may attempt to raise yields on the remaining land
by using fertilizer and pesticides more intensively.
Z
3
This example represents a partial analysis- The distrihution itself
will shift to the leftifthe support program increased productiom~.
Higher expected output would lower the probabilities ofobtain-
ing relatively high prices andl offset some of the increase in the
expected price.
24
This argument has been made for anumher ofyears, datinghack at
leastto Holbrook Working, ‘<PriceSupports and theEffectiveness
of 1-ledging,”Journa/ ofFarm Economics (December 1953), pp.
811—18,
25
Under reasonable assumptions, trmscating the lower tail ofthe
d istm’ibntion at P, also will reduce its variance.
Existing evidence suggests that these practices can
offset about one—half of the impact of an acreage
reduction. 20
Most important, however, is the recogtntiori that
grain is an internationally’ traded good and, hence,
grain prices are determined in the world market. 2<
Therefore, in the absence of tariffs or quotas, attempts
to reduce U. S. production will have to increase the
world price of grain in order to raise grain prices for
US. fhrmners. Because world grain supplies affect grain
prices in the United States and abroad, fttr more
acreage mntist be idled in the United States than would
be necessary if U,5, grain supplies alone affected the
U.S. grain price For example, if the U.S. elasticity of
demand fkr grain were — 0.2 but the elasticity of total
(U.S. domestic plus export) demand were — 15, the
influence ofa world market would require the idlirtg of
over 600 percent more land to achieve a 10 percent
increase in grain prices2” \Vithout cooperative agree-
ments for output reductions by’ other countries, U.S -
attempts to increase grain prices Lw idling acreage are
likely to be unsuccessful.2°
Stora.~ePrograms
Because price supports encourage increased pro-
duction and current acreage reduction programs arc
insufficient to offset this effect, ‘‘surpltis’’ stocks are
likely to accumulate in government storage. Histor-
ically, the CCC loan program has acquired this surplus
2
tfederal Reserve Bank ofChicago, Agmieultum-o/ Letter, No. 1595
(january 21, 1983).
~lmimnany years, U.S. policy has ignored this factand set loams rates
above worldprices. Becausetheloan rate is a floorfor U- S. prices,
minimumss U.S. prices n-crc maintained above the wom’ldl price.
Such a policy, Isowever, effectively removed the United States
from intcrmsational trade umsless otlserproducmng nations could not
fully satisfy worldl demand. tlserehy making tlse L’msited States the
supplier ofthe last resort.” i’hat is, U.S. grain was not traded
internationally because U.S. producem’s could receive returns
higher tlsan the world priceby selling grain domestically’ or plac-
ing it under CCC loan, Conversely, impom-ters woulrl buy U.S.
grain omsly ifall other tradimig partners could not supply it at the
lower world price.
25
This examplc’ and a moredetailed analysis can be found in Gard-
ner, Gom:emning ofAgricultume, p. 38—9. His example shows that a
10 percent increase inprice can be achieved by-a 2 percent output
reduction ifthe elasticity ofdemand is —0.2. Ifit is — 1,5, howev-
er, the same 10 percent increase in price requires a 15 percent
reduction in output. The approximate difference between these
otstput reductions is 600 percent.
29
lnact, the lack ofsuch anagreement hasallowed other producing
nations to he <<free-riders” with respect to U.S. grain programs.
That is, other conntries benefit from U.S. price support and
storage pi-ograms without payingany direct costs. This is pam’tiallv
why theUS. will hold 85 percent ofthe wom’lcl’scorn stocks and44
percent of its wheat stocks in 1983.
22FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS FEBRUARY 1983
production. More recently, however, the FOR has
been introduced to build even greater reserve stocks.
The stated intention of the program is to promote
greater price stability’ by increasing and manipulating
the mnean level of reserve stocks. To be successful,
then, the F’OR must accomplish two objectives: First,
it must increase the level of reserve stocks. Second,
this increase in stock levels and the handling of the
reserve itself must dampen the variability of grain
prices. The evidence to date, however, suggests that
neither objective has been achieved.
With respect to stock levels, the most current esti-
mate is that each additional bushel ofgrainin the FOR
represents only a 0.2 to 0.4 bushel addition to total,
privatelyowned stocks.’3°The closer this estimate is to
zero, the more strongly it suggests that farmers have
viewed the publicly-controlled FOR as a subsidized
alternative to private storage. That is, rather than
paying tokeepgrain in private storage, eligible farmers
can place grain in the FOR, receive a 26.5 cent per
bushel prepaid storage subsidy and pay no interest on
the last twoyears ofa three-year loan. The suhstittmtion
estimate of 0.2 to 0.4 might he closer to zero if par-
ticipation in the FOR did not require a three-year
contract during which the grain cannot be sold unless
market prices rise to a specified multiple of the loan
rate, As one analyst has remarked, however, “It is not
ckar that the FOR program has added significantlr’
more to either corn or wheat stocks than would have
been achieved by’ the CCC loan program without it- ‘‘31
Evidence todate alsosuggests that the FOR’s effects
on price stability havebeen contrary to the programns
presumed objectives. Frequent changes in program
rules — especially changes in trigger prices and other
factors that affect the release of FOR grain to the
market — have increased the uncertainty associated
with participation in the FOR. This uncertainty, it is
argued, also tends to increase the variability of market
prices’32 In a study of daily wheat and corn prices
before and after the establishment of the FOR, Gard-
ner fbund that the program, inf)1ct, was associated with
increased variability of gm-am prices Another study
using monthly- data yields results consistent with
.3mm,.~mange ofesti mm mates is presem m ted iml J erm’v A. S ham’ples, _‘t mm Fm;dm/Ua—
tmomm oft. S (,,,amn JO scmn P0/md mj 1971—SO U S Dm p mmtmm mmt of
Agricultmmrc-, Agrienltmmre Ec-onomme Rc’pom’t No. 481, Starch 982.
Brmmce C. Gam’clnc-r. ‘‘Consequ cmmc’cs of l”arm mm Policies I) mm rmngtIme
1970s,” in Pdmod our’ Agricu/tural Policy for t/me 1980s, D. Gale
olsmssom m , ed. - -\mn eric-an Em mm m-prmsc lmssti 1mmte, Wamh ingtoms - 0. ( -.-
1981.
32
Sce SI, am’ples “Am m Fvalnatiom m of t.’ . S. Cram mm Reserve Pu1 mey- and
d;mtrclmmcr , ‘‘Commscqmmem,cc’s of Farm Policies.
Gardner’s.33 This evidence smiggests that the F’OR has
been more stmccessful in transferring incometo farmers
through storage subsidies than it has in increasing
stocks or stabilizing grain prices.
The Paument-in-Kind Prog-ram (P1K)
In an effort to reconcile the results produced under
conflictingincentives, the USDA has implemented the
P1K program for 1983. Under its provisions, producers
who have reduced acreage by the 20 percent of base
stipulated by the RAP may idle up to an additional 30
percent of base acreage under P1K1 in some cases,
thrmers mayhidto idle their entireacreage. Participat-
ing corn producers will be given corn from CCC or
FOR reserves in an amount equal to 80 percent of the
normal yield on the number of acres idled.34
Because wheat producers already haveplanted their
winter crop, they will be given 95 percent of normal
yield if they plow it under to participate. Farticipating
farmers are then free to sell the grain they receive or
feed it to livestock. While participants will avoid the
costs of planting and harvesting acreage declared to
P1K, they probably will haye to plant some cover on
this land to prevent erosion.
l’he motivation behind FIK is twofold. On onehand,
it attempts to remove mnore land from production than
has been possible under existing programs. On the
other hand, the distribution ofreserve grain to farmers
will reduce surplus stocks. It is hoped this payment—in—
kind will reduce the costs ofsupport programs — now
at record highs and redttce the depressing effects
that large surplus stocks exert on market prices.
WiLL P1K WORK
Frelimirmary estimates by the USDA indicated that
P1K would idle about 23 million acres of land over and
above land alm-eadv taken from production by other
programns- Otherestimates ranged as high as50 million
acres,3’~The actual figures exceeded both estimates,
however, showing that over69 million acres had been
committed to the programn; tIns acm-cage is in addition to
the 13.2 mrmillion acres idled by the RAP alone.
-m-mStiebael T. Bc-lommgia, --Factors AHec’t imsg Placemc’msts of Corn and
\\-‘lseat i mm TIme F’armnem’—( )wnccl llesc’m’vc, pm’ocesscdl, Fc’l,ruarv
1983.
~Fam-mmmc’rs cu m’rcmmtlv wit lIm mmml grai mm mm CCC or Ft)II stocks mu mms 1 pmmt
tImcsr em m m-rc’mmt ermmp mmmlder CCC: loan tcm pam’tieipatc’ in P1K.
35
Wi IIian, Rohhi us - ‘‘Farm mm Officials Stu mmmp for Plamsto Reclmmc-c Hammt —
immg of Crops,’’ ,\‘emc’ York i’ummc.s (Jammmmarv 22. 1983).
23Although the 82.3 millionacres to be idled thisyear
are spread across seven crops, corn and wheat are
expected to show the largest reducions.~In fact,
about87 percent ofall acreage idledhas a base in corn
or wheat. But, because some uncertainty still exists
about the overall quality ofland planted and growing
season weather, yields may reinforce or offiet the
effectsofa reductionin acresplanted. Basedon reason-
ableassumptionsaboutincreases inyields, however, it
appears as if 1983 programs will cause output reduc-
lions on the order of 20 percent for wheat and 30
percent for corn.
The effects of 1983 crop programs on commodity
pricescan beestimated by usingcashprices at the lime
P1K was announced andthe total elasticity ofdemand
citedin an earlier example. That is, in January, when
P1K was announced as a new program option, cash
prices for corn and wheat were $2.58 and $4.08 per
bushel, respectively. The estimated total elasticity of
demandof —1.5 also suggests thata 1 percentdecline
in productionwill raise prices by 0.67 percent. There-
fore, fortheseestimates, a30percentreduction incorn
production implies a 20 percent increase in price.
Basedon aJanuary priceof$2.58, this simple analysis
suggests corn prices, at lime of harvest, will be near
$3.12 per bushel. A similar analysis for wheat shows
~The P1K program covers corn, wheat, sorghum, cotton and rice.
Barley and oatsare not included in P1K.




Programs to manage farm production and prices
havebeen in existence since the 1930s. An analysis of
currentprograms intended to limit surplusaccumula-
tionandraise farmprices indicates, however, that they
have failed to achieve either objective. Specifically,
supply reductions resulting from some programs
targeted at output reductions have beenofl~et by in-
centives to increase production contained in other
programs. The result has been a continuation ofthe
“farm problem”: chronic surpluses and relativelylow
prices.
The FIXprogram, the latesteflbrtto reconcile these
conflicts, could increase corn and wheat prices mar-
ginally above their support levels only if the most
optimistic estimates of farmer participation are real-
ized. Estimatesbased on USDAprojections, however,
indicate that surplus removal under P1K will not in-
crease corn or wheat prices substantially above their
targetprices. With surplus conditionsprevailing for at
least twomore years, the 1980sare unlikelyto become
the decade ofincreasing commodity shortagesandris-
ingrelativeprices thatmanyanalystsforecastjustafew
years ago.
24